Abstract. We simulate numerically a trade model with labor mobility costs added, modeled in such a way as to generate gross flows in excess of net flows. Adjustment to a trade shock can be slow with plausible parameter values. In our base case, the economy moves 95% of the distance to the new steady state in approximately eight years. Gross flows have a large effect on this rate of adjustment and on the normative effects of trade. Announcing and delaying the liberalization can build -or destroy -a constituency for free trade. We study the conditions under which these contrasting outcomes occur.
(henceforth CM) .
Specifically, we consider an economy initially in a steady state with a tariff that is then opened to free trade, in two possible ways: first, sudden, unannounced liberalization, and then delayed, pre-announced liberalization. We study the time-path of the economy's adjustment, the evolution of wages, and the welfare of workers in exporting and import-competing sectors. We find that both the positive and the normative effects of trade can be very different for an anticipated and an unanticipated liberalization, and also for different parameter values that yield different levels of gross flows.
Various approaches have been used to incorporate imperfect labor mobility into trade models. One approach has been to adapt the convex adjustment cost assumed for capital in Mussa (1978) to labor, reinterpreting it perhaps as a retraining cost. Examples of this are Karp and Thierry (1994) and Dehejia (2003) . Another is to assume that each worker must pay a fixed cost to switch sectors. Examples include Dixit (1993) and Dixit and Rob (1994) in a dynamic model with stochastic shocks to labor demand across sectors, and Feenstra and Lewis (1994) in a static model. These all have in common the property that if labor moves across sectors, it all moves in the same direction at any one time, or in other words, gross flows are equal to net flows.
An approach that allows for gross flows in excess of net flows is explored in Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) and Davidson and Matusz (2001) . This approach is based on search theory; workers may leave one sector to find a job in another, but at the cost of temporary unemployment while looking for a vacancy. The approach pursued in the current paper differs from that series in a variety of ways, but most crucially it has been designed to be as close as possible to familiar trade models. For example, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) show that in a model with the usual sources of comparative advantage shut down, a country can still have gains from trade due to differences in search technology across countries. In our model, by contrast, the gains from trade stem from the same sources as in a Ricardo-Viner model.
A major focus of this paper is the effect of delay in trade liberalization, or the practice of government announcing a future elimination of trade barriers in order to allow private agents time to adjust. This is a special case of 'gradualism,' or liberalization through scheduled progressive stages, which is an extremely common practice in real-world trade reform. Mussa (1978) showed that in a neoclassical model there is no strictly economic argument for gradualism. Staiger (1995) and Bond and Park (2002) examine different reasons that gradualism can be useful in loosening incentive-compatibility constraints in bilateral liberalization without commitment. Dehejia (2003) shows that, in a labor-rich Heckscher-Ohlin economy with convex moving costs for labor, gradualism can make the import-competing workers net beneficiaries from trade reform, instead of net losers. This can make the liberalization politically feasible, while a 'shock therapy' liberalization would have been infeasible. In this paper, we will explore the Dehejia argument with a different model, one featuring gross flows, and arrive at quite different results.
The next section lays out the model, the following one reports some baseline simulations showing how changes in the moving cost parameters change the economy's dynamic adjustment, and the subsequent section studies in detail the possible attractiveness of delayed liberalization as a way of spreading the benefits of trade more widely.
The Model.
Consider a small open economy that can produce two goods, X and Y. Good Y is the numeraire, and the price of X is denoted by p. Both goods are produced under competitive conditions with constant-returns-to-scale technology q = Q ( L , K ), where q denotes output in
sector i, L and K denote labor and capital employed in sector i respectively. Capital in each sector i i is inelastically supplied, and is specific to its sector. The total supply of labor in the economy is exogenously given at a value L 6, so at all points the adding-up condition for labor must hold:
XY
Workers can move from one sector to another over time, but at each date the supply of labor to each sector is fixed by location decisions in previous periods. Wages in each sector adjust to clear the spot market for labor at each date:
where a subscript indicates time and w # is the wage in sector i in period t, denominated in terms of i the numeraire.
The assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks are iid is, of course, for illustrative purposes 1 and is not terribly realistic. There are many reasons that the shocks may be serially correlated in the real world, as when mobility is hampered by the cost of children switching schools, and there are many reasons the shocks could have different variances. If the example cited above of a worker falling in love with a worker in another sector were taken literally, that would imply that a positive shock was more likely to draw the worker to a larger sector than a smaller one, simply because there are more potential romantic matches in a larger sector. We have chosen to eliminate all of these effects by fiat in order to concentrate on the questions of greatest concern to us. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for clarifying our thinking on this.
Workers.
All workers discount the future at the common rate $ < 1. There is, then, an idiosyncratic cost to switching sectors, as a worker who leaves i in order to enter sector j at time t forgoes the i benefit and reaps the j benefit instead. This implies an idiosyncratic moving cost of:
ii j
The cdf for this moving cost is derived from F and denoted G; similarly, the pdf is denoted g.
In addition to the idiosyncratic moving cost, a worker who changes sectors will also incur a common cost equal to C $ 0.
Worker optimization. t
Let V (L ) stand for the expected discounted utility of a worker in sector i at time t (before i t learning idiosyncratic shocks , ). Worker optimization implies the Bellman equation:
where the expectation is taken with respect to , and , ; i, j 0 {X, Y} and ij; and w = w # /N(p)
is the real utility wage. It is easy to see that at any date t there is a threshold value of : , say : 6 , ii t t t t t such that the worker will stay in i if : > : 6 , and will move to j if : < : 6 . Put differently, : 6 is the ii ii i net value of being in j rather than i next period, net of non-idiosyncratic moving costs. This enables us to write:
XY
It is easy to see that this steady state is unique. In addition, note that the steady state 2 features positive gross flows but zero net flows.
According to the model there should be a positive correlation in the long run between 3 industry size and industry average wages. We have confirmed this by calculating the correlation Using this notation, the Bellman equation becomes:
where S(: 6 ) = E max{0, : 6 ! : } = is the option value of a worker in i i sector i. In addition, the law of motion for labor allocations can be written:
since the fraction of workers in i who move to j in any period is equal to G(: 6 ). Dixit and Norman (1980) .) The optimization problem can be implemented as a straightforward dynamic programming problem. Because the value function is strictly concave, the solution to this optimization problem, and hence the equilibrium, is unique.
This optimization approach could be useful in computing the equilibrium numerically, although we use a different method in this paper. A few properties of the equilibrium dynamics are also derived.
If trade is suddenly opened up in an economy that had been closed, the economy adjusts gradually and monotonically to the new steady state as the import-competing sector shrinks. A number of local results are derived regarding this in CM, that is, results that are valid if the world price is close enough to the domestic autarkic price. First, starting from an autarkic steady state, it is shown that it is possible for all workers to benefit from a surprise opening of trade (in t terms of lifetime expected utility, V (L )). It is also possible for all workers to be hurt, and it is i possible for workers initially in the export sector to benefit and workers in the import-competing sector to be hurt. (The benefit to export-sector workers always exceeds the benefit to importcompeting workers.) Refer to the first two cases as cases in which workers are 'unanimous,' and the last case as one in which workers are 'split.' In cases in which the workers are unanimous without delay, delay does nothing to change their minds, but in cases in which they are split a sufficiently long delay will guarantee unanimity. However, it could be a pro-trade or an anti-trade unanimity. CM derive a condition that determines which of the two cases occurs, in the local case.
It essentially says that if export-sector labor demand is responsive enough compared to importcompeting-sector labor demand, delay leads to pro-trade unanimity, and otherwise it leads to an antitrade unanimity. In this paper, we explore these questions numerically to try to quantify these effects and to map out the portions of the parameter space in which these outcomes occur without relying on the assumption of the nearness of the world price to the autarkic price.
Parameters and simulation method.
We will study an economy that is initially in a steady state with a tariff, but then has the tariff removed either abruptly or with some warning. Here we will lay out the functional form and parameter assumptions and the method for computing equilibrium responses to these policy changes.
The economy has 1 unit of specific capital in each of the two sectors and 2 units of labor in total. We adopt the following functional-form assumptions. Production functions are of the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) variety:
and
where D(i) 0 (!4, 1) is a parameter. The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in sector
Note that the production functions have been normalized so that regardless of the elasticity of substitution chosen, the unit isoquant will always go through the point (1, 1).
Preferences are given by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
where C represents consumption of good i, yielding the indirect utility function
where p and p are the product prices and I is income. Given that Y is the numeraire, the indirect X Y utility function becomes:
for given income I and price p for good X, where the consumer price index N is given by N(p) = p .
½
It is straightforward to see that as a result of these production and consumption assumptions the value p = 1 is always the steady-state equilibrium price in autarky, regardless of the substitution elasticities, with equal wages in the two sectors (equal to ½) and an equal division of labor between the sectors. This is a useful benchmark. We will assume that the world relative price of X is p = 0.7, and that before the liberalization the tariff is set just high enough that the domestic relative 
where ( / 0.5772 is Euler's constant. The mean of , is then zero, and its variance is then equal to (B<)/6 (Patel, Kapadia, and Owen (1976, p.35) , and that S(:) = < log(1 + exp(:/<)).
(Derivations are available from the authors on request.)
The trade liberalization proceeds as follows. Suppose that the economy is in a steady state with tariff at date t = 0, and then it is announced that at date T $ 0 and from that date forward, free t t trade will prevail. Thus, we have p = 1 for t < T, and p = p for t $ T. If T = 0, this simply means We compute equilibrium by the following method. First, use steady-state versions of (1), (2), (3) and (4) to compute the free-trade steady state. Next, choose a value for T , say, T = 30,
SS SS
and conjecture that the system will come to within a given tolerance level of the steady state by date
T . Then, for each date from t = 0 to T , we conjecture a value z for V (L ) and a value z
for V (L ). Denote these vectors by z / for j = X, Y . By (2), these values can be used z . Thus, we set z # = w + S(: 6 ) + $ z for t = 0 to T ! 1, and using the assumption that jj SS the system is in steady state by date T , we set . We then SS X X compare z to z # , and if they match to within our convergence tolerance, we stop, otherwise the X, t process is repeated using an updated initial guess in place of z . We then confirm that the system is within our tolerance of steady state by date T ; if not, a higher value of T is chosen and we start
the algorithm from the beginning. This algorithm is similar to the multiple-shooting technique of Lipton et. al. (1982) . Program code and details are available from the authors on request. The process converges quickly to a high degree of precision.
Once the equilibrium transition path has been computed, it is straightforward to compute the welfare of a worker currently in sector i at the date of the policy announcement There will be no tariff revenues in the initial steady state, because there will be no imports.
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There will certainly be no tariff revenues after the tariff has been eliminated. In between, there will generally be positive tariff revenue. In order to work out who the net gainers from trade are, we need to make an arbitrary assumption about how the government disposes of the tariff revenue. We assume that all of these revenues are captured by the owners of the fixed factors, conjecturing that alternative assumptions would not make much difference to the results. as . We compare this to the utility of a worker in the tariff-affected steady-4 state, to evaluate whether the given worker is made better or worse off by the announced policy. The welfare of owners of fixed factors can be computed in analogous fashion, as the present discounted value of their marginal products, deflated by the consumer price index. We set $ equal to 0.97, which seems reasonable for an annual discount factor and allows us to interpret the 'periods' in our simulations as 'years.'
It should be noted that our focus is on workers, so we ignore the welfare effects on specific factors. Given that this is a rational-expectations economy with no externalities, total welfare is always higher with trade than under autarky, so if worker welfare declines as a result of trade, there is necessarily a corresponding and larger increase in the welfare of specific factors as a whole.
Further, it is straightforward to confirm that in these simulations the welfare of owners of importcompeting specific factors is always lowered by trade, with the opposite effect on owners of factors specific to the export sector.
To sum up, the fixed parameters are $ = 0.97; K = K = 1; L 6 = 2; and p = 0.7. The pre-
liberalization relative price is equal to unity. The free parameters are the two substitution elasticities of the idiosyncratic variance parameter <, and then a second set to identify the conditions under which delay can improve the distributional effects of liberalization.
Dynamics in base case simulations.
We need to choose values of C and < for a base case simulation. We turn to estimates in Artuc (2006), where a similar model is estimated with data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. For the base case in those estimations, the moving cost is between two and three times average annual wages, so we will set C equal to 1 for the base case (recalling that steady-state wages before liberalization are equal to 0.5 in each sector). This is, of course, a high value. In interpreting these parameters, it should be kept in mind that the inertia in labor flows exhibited in the data reflects the full costs of moving, psychic as well as pecuniary, plus any unmodelled frictions that may impede movement. We also contrast the base case with simulations based on a much lower moving cost, with C = 0.33. In both cases, we set v so that the steady-state rate of gross flows with the tariff is approximately equal to 4 per cent per year. Thus, in the Base
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Case we have C = 1 and < = 0.31, and in the Low-Cost Case we have C = 0.33 and < = 0.10. Figure 1 shows the time path of X-sector employment L under four situations, a sudden X removal of the tariff at date 0 for the Benchmark and Low-Cost cases, and an announcement at date 0 that the tariff will be removed at date 10 for the Benchmark and the Low-Cost cases.
Note that the adjustments for both delayed and sudden liberalization cases are gradual, as in each period import-competing workers who have high current moving costs wait to see if their moving costs will be more favorable in the near future. In the case of the surprise liberalization with
Benchmark parameters, it takes about 8 years for the economy to move 95% of the distance to the new steady state, while in the case of delayed liberalization the adjustment is even slower. This suggests a possible problem for application of steady state models to data, unless one is willing to assume that trade shocks occur very infrequently.
Note as well that in the case of delayed liberalization, workers begin to move at the date of the policy announcement, as import-competing workers who have very low current moving costs take advantage of them rather than risk being stuck with high moving costs later. In fact, more than three quarters of the adjustment occurs before the policy change. This suggests a possible problem for empirical approaches that are based on comparison of sectoral employment before and after the elimination of the tariff.
In the event of a sudden liberalization, X-sector real wages drop immediately and gradually climb as labor leaves the sector (Figure 2 , broken line), while Y-sector real wages jump up due to the reduced cost of living, then gradually fall as workers enter the sector (Figure 3 , broken line).
The steady-state wage is slightly higher for workers in the export sector (0.520) than for workers in the import-competing sector (0.508). For all of these reasons, the Y workers benefit more from the liberalization than the X workers do, although welfare of workers in both sectors rises when the liberalization is announced (by about 1.7% for import-competing workers and 3.7% for export workers).
At first glance, it may be surprising that import-competing workers benefit from liberalization, since wages in that sector drop dramatically at the date of liberalization, recovering only gradually, and finally taking a value only slightly higher than their old steady-state value, as can be seen from Figure 2 . However, when the liberalization occurs, the rate at which workers flow out of the import-competing sector rises abruptly, so that the probability that a given worker who is initially in the import-competing sector enters the export sector within ten years of the liberalization exceeds fifty per cent. Thus, import-competing workers care as much about wages in the export sector as in the import-competing sector -or, put differently, option values rise by enough in the import-competing sector to overwhelm the drop in wages there. Note that this underlines the importance of gross flows for welfare analysis; a naive analysis would measure the drop in wages in the X sector following the liberalization and conclude, incorrectly, that X-sector workers were worse off.
In the event of delayed liberalization, the X-sector wage begins to rise during the interval between announcement and actual removal of the tariff, as workers leave the sector in anticipation (Figure 2 , solid line). The wage drops abruptly when the tariff is removed. At the same time, the wage in the export sector is pushed down as workers enter, and jumps up abruptly when the tariff is removed (Figure 3 , solid line). As a result, the net benefit to import-competing workers is greater, and the net benefit to export workers is less, than in the case with no delay. In this case, both groups of worker now see a rise in welfare from the liberalization of about 2%.
For the Low-Cost case, the adjustment of workers is faster than in the Benchmark case (see Figure 1 ). However, note that in the case of delay, the bulk of the labor adjustment takes place close to the actual trade liberalization date rather than right after the announcement date. In the limit with zero moving costs, the model would imitate a static Ricado-Viner model.
In the last two cases examined in this section, we vary <, holding C = 1.0, in order to see how
The high-variance case has < = 0.94, and the low-variance case has< = 0.10. sector, and are cheered by news of higher wages in the other sector because they know that they will likely spend time in that sector soon.
By contrast, in the low-variance case the economy is sluggish but has more reallocation in the steady state; once again, see Figure 4 . In the low-variance case, the economy achieves 95% of its adjustment in 31 years, while in the high-variance case it takes only 3 years. In the high variance case with delay, 61% of the adjustment is completed by the date the tariff is removed, while in the low variance case 39% is completed by that date.
A surprising fact about long-run wages emerges from the low-variance case. The long-run wage the export sector is 0.517, while in the import-competing sector it is 0.513. Thus, the long-run wage differential between the two sectors is much narrower than it is in the other two parametric cases, despite the sluggishness of labor movements. This is an illustration of a general result shown in Cameron, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2003) , that as the idiosyncratic variance becomes vanishingly small, the long-run wage differential across sectors also becomes vanishingly small (even if C does not become small itself). The point is that although labor adjustment is very sluggish, the long run elasticity of intersectoral labor supply with respect to wage differentials is very large when the idiosyncratic variance is small. Thus, even though this is a model with very low mobility of labor, 8 if one focusses on steady state wage differentials, one may be deceived into thinking it is a model with a very high degree of mobility; the steady state is close to the equilibrium of a static frictionless model. At the same time, obviously, because adjustment is slow, the steady state is not sufficient for welfare analysis.
A final point about all three cases is that the short run behaviour of wages is very different from the long-run behaviour. In each case, with an unannounced tariff removal, the real wage in the import-competing sector falls on impact, and the wage in the export sector rises. However, as we have seen in the discussion of the results, this is very different from the behaviour both of long-run wages and of worker welfare. For example, for the benchmark and low variance cases the long run wage is higher for import-competing workers than the original steady state wage, and in the highvariance case, although import-competing wages never recover, the import-competing workers are better off. As a result, results from an empirical approach focussed only on comparing wages in the two sectors immediately before and after the tariff reduction must be interpreted with care.
Delay and Worker Unity.
A point that emerges from the simulations above is that delaying the liberalization tends to increase the gains (or reduce the losses) to import-competing workers, by temporarily raising their wage, and tends to reduce the gains (or increase the losses) to export workers, by temporarily lowering their wages. This can have important effects on the pattern of net beneficiaries from the liberalization. In particular, in cases in which import-competing workers would have been opposed to an immediate liberalization, it is possible that a delayed liberalization would unite all workers, either in favor of or in opposition to free trade. In this section, we examine this argument in more detail.
In CM, it is shown that locally the determinant of whether delay will tend to unite workers in favor of or in opposition to free trade is the relative long-run responsiveness of X-and Y-sector output to a change in total labor supply. Essentially, if the demand for labor in the import-competing sector is very inelastic, delay will unite workers in favor of trade, while if the demand for labor in the export sector is very inelastic, delay will unite workers against trade. A natural way to parametrize this is by varying the sectoral elasticities of factor substitution F(X) and F(Y). Of course, if F(i) is close to zero, then the output response of sector i must be close to zero, and the higher is the elasticity the better the sector would be able to absorb and make use of additional supplies of labor.
We have performed the following experiment. In other words, we search for the minimal delay required to achieve unanimity among the workers regarding their support for free trade.
Note that if F(X) is low enough, then all workers will benefit from free trade even if it is sprung by surprise, as reflected in the fact that the 'Sudden liberalization benefits all workers' region lies against the vertical axis. This is because free trade will raise the demand for export-sector workers; if labor demand in the import-competing sector is very inelastic (as would be the case with
Leontieff technology), this will result in a sharp increase in import-competing sector wages, which will dominate other effects. Similarly, if F(Y) is low enough, then all workers will be hurt by free trade if it is sprung by surprise, as reflected in the fact that the 'Sudden liberalization hurts all workers' region lies against the horizontal axis. This is because free trade will lower the demand for import-competing-sector workers; if labor demand in the export sector is very inelastic, this will result in a sharp decrease in export-sector wages, which will dominate other effects. It is the region in between in which the workers are split.
A broken line divides that region of worker disunity into two sections. The section above the broken line contains parameter values for which a sufficient delay makes all workers net beneficiaries from liberalization. For these points, labor demand in the import-competing sector is sufficiently inelastic relative to the export sector that the rise in import-competing wages during the period of anticipation is the dominant effect, converting import-competing workers into net beneficiaries of the process. The section below the broken line contains parameter values for which a sufficient delay makes all workers net losers from liberalization. This is the paradoxical case in which giving private agents time to adjust to the new trade regime unites all workers in opposition to free trade. For these points, labor demand in the export sector is sufficiently inelastic relative to the export sector that the fall in export sector wages during the period of anticipation is the dominant effect, converting export workers into net victims of the process.
Thus, in contrast to Dehejia (2003) , we find that the use of delay to soften political resistance to liberalization is rather treacherous. In this framework, it creates constituencies for liberalization only in a small portion of the parameter space, which is right adjacent to a portion of the parameter space where delay destroys constituencies for liberalization. There are a number of key differences between our model and Dehejia's: for example, we examine delayed liberalization, rather than gradualism; our model of adjustment costs allows for gross flows and long-run wage differentials, while his does not. However, the difference that is most likely salient for understanding this contrast in results is the underlying structure of the economy (see Chaudhuri and McLaren (20003a) for a formal analysis of this in the case of the present model). Dehejia's is a labor-rich Heckscher-Ohlin model with added adjustment costs; in the absence of adjustment costs, workers would gain from liberalization unambiguously. Our model is a specific-factors model with added adjustment costs;
in the absence of adjustment costs, workers can gain or lose from trade depending on parameters.
For example, in the limit, as the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the export sector becomes very low, workers will be unambiguously hurt (in effect, labor demand in the import-competing sector falls, while labor demand in the export sector is unchanged). On the other hand, if the elasticity is very low in the import-competing sector, workers will unambiguously benefit (labor demand in the export sector rises, while labor demand in the import-competing sector is unchanged). See Mussa (1974) ) for a full discussion of the static model.
These forces at work in the static model also drive the direction of workers' welfare effects in the case of delay. We conjecture that, for the same reasons, in a capital-rich version of the Dehejia model, we would find workers unanimous in opposition to a gradual trade liberalization, for the same reasons.
The minimum delay required to achieve worker unanimity varies widely over the parameter space, and is plotted in the shark's fin diagram of Figure 6 . The horizontal axes measure the elasticities of substitution in the two sectors, and the vertical axis measures the number of periods of delay required to reach unanimity. The flat water surrounding the fin shows the zero delay required to achieve unanimity either for or against trade if one sector has a much lower elasticity than the other. The face of the fin facing the F(X) axis corresponds to the points in Figure 5 for which delayed liberalization hurts all workers, and the other face corresponds to the points for which delayed liberalization benefits all workers. The ridge joining the two faces corresponds to the points along the broken curve in Figure 5 .
Not surprisingly, the points near the regions in which workers are unanimous without delay are the ones for which the shortest delay is required. As we move farther from those boundaries, the delay required becomes longer, thus reducing the aggregate benefit from liberalization. Thus, delay is most attractive the closer the economy is to the upper solid curve in Figure 5 (while still being below it). It is least attractive near the broken curve in Figure 5 , where not only is a very long delay necessary to win the support of import-competing workers, but a small perturbation in parameter values would lead to the paradoxical case in which the support of export workers would be destroyed. Thus, if there was any uncertainty about parameter values, the delay strategy could be very risky.
A fuller analysis of policy options would include the possibility of compensatory transfers or direct labor market interventions rather than, or in addition to, delay. Such policies are studied in detail in Feenstra and Lewis (1994) and Davidson and Matusz (2002) . It seems sensible to speculate that delay would be more attractive relative to those other options the closer the parameters are to the upper solid curve. However, analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion.
We have studied numerical simulations of a standard trade model with labor mobility costs added, modeled in such a way as to generate gross flows in excess of net flows. Major conclusions can be summarized as follows.
(1) Adjustment to a trade shock can take a long time with plausible values of parameter values.
In our base case, for the economy to move 95% of the distance to the new steady state took approximately eight years.
(2) Gross flows matter a great deal. In our model version with high gross flows (the 'high variance' model of Section 3), there was very little net movement of workers, so trade liberalization resulted in a sharp rise in wage in the one sector and a sharp drop in the other in the short run and in the long one. However, because of the high mobility of workers, actual welfare of workers even in the import-competing sector rose. On the other hand, with low gross flows (the 'low variance' model), long-run net movement of workers is large, but the adjustment takes more than 40 years.
Thus, empirical estimates of the parameters that govern rates of gross flow would be valuable in studying hypothetical policy changes through simulation.
(3) Announcing and delaying the liberalization can build a constituency for free trade, but it can also destroy one. We have studied the conditions under which these two different outcomes occur.
Along the way, we have shown how equilibrium in this model can be computed and a variety of policy experiments simulated, illustrating techniques that can then be applied to a wide variety of policy questions.
